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Introduction.
According to their widespread use in public finance unit and ad valorem taxes are popular taxes.
For this reason there is a clear interest in analysing the workings of precisely these two taxes in spite of the fact that there are, as noted by Hamilton (2009) , many other instruments. On the other hand, it is well known that both taxes are shifted into the price consumers pay. That is, when used in a monopolised market, or other imperfectly competitive markets, these taxes drive the price even further above the marginal cost. On this basis it is of interest to look at the efficiency of digressive taxes, and, moreover, if the application of such taxes are equally practical to unit and ad valorem taxes.
Digressive taxes provide the opposite incentive to unit and ad valorem taxes; hence, under such taxes firms expand output. When applied in imperfectly competitive markets the margin between price and marginal cost narrows under such taxes (Dalton, 1929 2 and Robinson, 1933) . A tax on price is an example of a digressive tax. In this paper we study the workings of such a tax in monopoly. As a practical matter it is possible to implement a tax on price as variable rate sales tax (Hamilton, 1999) . There are other ways to introduce digressive tax schemes. Assuming that the marginal cost is non-decreasing a tax based on the Lerner index will do. When the tax relates positively to the index the marginal tax is decreasing and, in turn, gives the monopolists incentive to expand output. A tax scheme based on the difference between price and average cost has similar effects.
The idea that a tax on price counteracts monopolistic behaviour and, at the same time, secures revenue is discussed in Shilling (1969) . Subsequently Tam (1991) shows some results on the workings of a tax on price but, as argued by Sumner (1993) it is unclear how a tax on price relates to welfare. 3 It is also unclear whether it is practical to use a tax on price. The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, we want to see how efficient a tax on price actually is. Especially, we analyse the relationship between the allocation under Ramsey pricing and under a combination of a tax on price and ad valorem taxation, respectively. 4 The Ramsey price is the price set by a regulator so that the monopolistic firm is ensured some fixed revenue whilst social welfare is maximised. The monopoly profit is of course the maximum that it is possible to extract by taxation. Hence, in the absence of lump sum taxes Ramsey pricing gives the most efficient allocation that can be reached subject to some restriction on tax revenue.
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Second, an objection against digressive taxes is that they are impractical because of the information needed in order to use them. If information difficulties make it impractical to apply the theoretically ideal tax structure it is relevant to ask when a practical reform of existing taxes results in a gain. To demonstrate this way of reasoning, consider excise versus ad valorem taxes. A practical reform is a matched-pair tax reform; that is, an increase in the ad valorem tax rate that matches the decrease in the excise tax measured at before-reform price. This kind of reform does not require knowledge about demand and cost conditions. Based on first-round effects ad valorem taxes are better than unit taxes. What Suits and Musgrave (1953) show, is that inclusion of second-round effects will not
change the dominance of ad valorem over excise taxes. By parallel reasoning, we ask about a practical welfare improving tax reform based on a tax on price to see if such reform in fact is stopped by information constraints.
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In Section 2 we analyse an example to demonstrate the idea. 7 In Section 3 we make the point in general and discuss practically feasible tax reform. Section 4 concludes.
Example
We consider a monopolistic firm where is demand for the monopolist's output, called and is production cost. It is assumed that cost and demand are linear functions of output, that is and There are (at least) three ways to generate tax revenue; a tax on the firm's turnover, a unit tax, and a tax on the price set by the monopolist. Revenue under an ad valorem tax is , where the ad valorem tax rate is . Output and price under ad valorem taxation is and respectively. Ad valorem taxation harms consumers through changing the final price.
Although we do not focus on unit taxes notice that the monopolist's output is where is the tax rate. The price is showing that consumers are harmed by the excise tax. Comparing tax rates with the same final price, gives and
revenue generated by the ad valorem tax exceeds that generated by the excise tax when or Using , the condition comes down to after some rewriting. 8 This result is what is shown more generally in Suits and Musgrave (1953) .
As a substitute for the ad valorem tax, consider a linear tax paid on the basis of the price charged by the monopolist. When the tax rate is , the monopolist's profit is .
Output and price are and in that order. Plainly, a tax on price drives the price below the price in an unregulated monopoly and, contrary to ad valorem taxes, the price change is a benefit to consumers. Obviously, it is impossible to compare ad valorem taxes to a tax on price on an equal price basis. In the example in this section, we therefore take a more direct approach and ask whether the revenue attained by use of ad valorem taxation can be obtained with a tax on price set by the monopolist. That is, it is a non-marginal tax change where one tax fully replaces the other tax.
As noted above, under a tax on price the monopolist's profit maximising output is and the price is For positive tax rates 9 output is positive and the price is well-defined when The tax revenue is and we want to ask whether it is possible that for some given say whilst Clearly, tax revenue is the same under the two taxes when
Suppose that and use the positive radical so that is positive. It is easy to see that the solution satisfies Hence, when the solution to for some , say , is well-
defined, we can find a tax on price that is of equal yield to the ad valorem tax but with lower consumer price.
The restriction gives a restriction on the possibility of replacing the ad valorem tax with a tax on price when one uses either one or the other of the two taxes. Under ad valorem taxation revenue is ! " Hence, the restriction comes down to # " For ad valorem tax rates less than half, the inequality is easily seen to be satisfied. For ad valorem tax rates higher than a half, the inequality is satisfied dependent on parameters. An example where the inequality fails to be satisfied is in the case of vanishing marginal costs and ad valorem tax rates higher than one half. This is unsurprising. The monopolist maximises revenue when marginal costs are imperceptible and can be ignored. Thus, tax revenue is equal or close to ! " A tax on price drives the price down, thus limiting the revenue that can be generated.
Generalisations
The example in the preceding section is based on the assumption that a tax on price fully replaces ad valorem taxation. The example makes clear that it is not in general possible to find a tax on price which can match the revenue from ad valorem taxation. This does not suggest that a tax on price is irrelevant. Rather, the result only shows the limitations of the specific functional forms used. That is, the example illustrates why it is more proper to ask about the effect of a tax reform where ad valorem and taxes on price are both in use.
/ Under a combination of an ad valorem tax and a tax on price the monopolist's profit is $ Following Suits and Musgrave (1953) there are two ways to compare taxes: either to find a set of taxes which will result in the same final price and output and inspect the resulting revenues, or to find a set of taxes that produce equal revenue, and then to compare prices and outputs. For obvious reasons we apply the latter comparison. Consider combinations of tax rates with a fixed yield of , where output and price are functions of the tax rates, and (but for brevity written without the arguments). Unsurprisingly, we restrict attention to ad valorem tax rates for which & ( ( The tax on price must satisfy & since the monopolist closes down otherwise. Throughout we maintain the next assumption to characterise feasible tax plans.
) $
Assumption 1. There is a pair of tax rates, ) * * + so that & for & ( ( * and
Unless Assumption 1 is satisfied it clearly does not make sense to compare the two taxes. From the change in tax rates that keeps intact revenue is: , ,
Clearly, for & ( -and & output is below unregulated monopoly output. Thus, the right hand side of equation (2) End of proof.
Conclusions.
In this paper we have re-examined a tax on price. The appeal of such a tax is that it simultaneously provides revenue and incentives for firms to reduce price (Tam 1991 , and Sumner 1993 .
Taking the profit constraint explicitly into consideration we have worked out how far the efficiency of a tax on price goes (Propositions 1 and 2). Moreover, we have shown that a combination of ad valorem tax and a tax on price produces the allocation corresponding to Ramsey pricing (Proposition 3). In this way, the combination of the two taxes is an efficient tax policy in the sense that the unavoidable deadweight loss that goes with taxing a monopolist (given non-availability of lump-sum taxes) is minimised.
Unsurprisingly, identifying fixed revenue combinations of a tax on price and an ad valorem tax calls for knowledge about demand and cost conditions. On this account Glaister (1987) suggests that the tax is of limited practical value. Similarly, Dalton (1929) and Robinson (1933) discuss output-based subsidies but dismisses them as a practical possibility. This is surely the case when the tax scheme is to be constructed so as to induce the Ramsey optimum. Nevertheless, it is possible to design a practical and beneficial tax reform that combines ad valorem taxation with a tax on price. First, the tax reform is practical since it is based on matched-pair tax reforms, i.e., it is based on observation of price and output. Second, it is beneficial because it goes some way in minimising the deadweight loss that is unavoidable when taxing a monopolist.
